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Abstract 
 
This paper enquires into the understanding of violence, and the place of violence in the 
understanding of politics, in the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.  These two 
engaged in a dispute about the place of violence in their respective philosophical projects. The 
trajectories of their respective subsequent bodies of thought about power, politics and justice, 
and the degrees of affirmation or condemnation of violent nature of reality, language, society 
and authority can be analysed in relation to political traditions of realism, radicalism and 
liberalism.  We trace the starting points, and points of convergence and divergence, between 
them, and consider the implications of their work for our capacity to critically judge episodes 
and uses of violence in political contexts.   
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1. Introduction  
 In this paper we examine the construction and evaluation of violence in the work of 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004).  This critical work is part of a 
larger project in which we examine justifications of violence, and theoretical treatments of 
violence as a theme, in political theory contexts.  In particular we here enquire of Foucault 
and Derrida what critical and normative resources they offer for judgement, both of uses of 
violence in politics, and also of the ways in which conceptual and theoretical links are made 
between politics and violence in their own, and in others', political thought.   
 Differences between Foucault and Derrida are vividly apparent in their famous 
dispute about the interpretation of Descartes' cogito, and Foucault’s thesis about the origins 
of the ‘division’ between reason and unreason in the classical age.1  Derrida accuses 
Foucault’s work in Folie et deraison (1961) of doing violence to Descartes’ Meditations as 
philosophy, and, more generally, of enacting a totalitarian kind of violence.2   Foucault’s 
response to this charge, in turn, identifies Derridean deconstruction with sovereign exclusion, 
the permanent possibility of making texts subject to the sovereign, arbitrary power of the 
reader.3  Foucault and Derrida differ, in shifting ways across the trajectory of their work, in 
their respective degrees of affirmation and condemnation of the violent nature of reality, 
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social relations, language and knowledge.  The cogito dispute illustrates the differences in the 
ways, in their early work,  they conceptualise and characterise violence.   
 The developments of their thinking about the nature and role of violence, however, 
also show some convergences, in particular in the implications for theory of the relation 
between violence and politics. Ultimately, we argue,  Derrida and Foucault share what might 
be called a ‘radical resignation’ about violence.  For both, the possibilities of a world without 
violence are elusive or even nonsensical. In Foucault’s case, throughout, a fascination with the 
radical possibilities of violence is accompanied by a constant confirmation of the close 
relation between violent practices and sovereign, disciplinary and bio-political power.   
Derrida’s ‘radical resignation’ takes different forms at different times.  In his early work the 
finding of violence everywhere is accompanied by condemnation but also by an implied view 
that violence simply is ubiquitous.  In later work, he conceptualises different forms of 
violence - specifically, worse and better.  He also addresses the theme of responsibility in 
connection with necessary and inevitable violence.  In the end, for both thinkers, violence 
presents a ubiquitous challenge, but also a condition of possibility, for political thought and 
action.  We can link Foucault's articulation of politics and violence with the Sorelian tradition 
of 'virtuous violence'. 4   Derrida's later work links clearly to the theme of human rights, and 
in particular to the role of international organisations in their realisation.  Ultimately their 
understandings of the meaning and effects of violence remain distinct, and the broader 
conclusions they draw for political judgment and practice, in a violent world, are not the 
same.  
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2.  Violence, Reason and the Subject  
“Evil is freed from all that its wealth of iconographic fauna could do, to preserve only a 
general power of intimidation: the secret danger of an animality that lies in wait and, 
all at once, undoes reason in violence and truth in the madman’s frenzy”.5 
This sentence from Foucault’s account of the place of madness in shifting constructions of 
forms of unreason in the classical age typifies the ways in which violence is characterised in 
his early work. On the one hand, violence is always felt, embodied and historicized.  On the 
other, extremes of violence potentially challenge predominant grids of intelligibility, in this 
case the division between reason and unreason. According to Foucault, Descartes’ exclusion 
of the possibility of madness from the systematic process of doubt in the Meditations 
prefigures the repressive violence of the great internment and subsequent histories of how 
madness is thought and ‘treated’ in the age of enlightenment. But it also confirms madness in 
itself as ‘other’ to rational order, a permanent violent challenge to the rule of reason, one that 
is never fully captured or controlled by the normative division between reason and unreason.  
 It is this position that Derrida criticised when, in a 1963 lecture to an audience that 
included Foucault, he questioned Foucault’s ontological or metaphysical commitment to 
‘madness’ as a reality beyond the historical social forms of sanity and insanity.6  Derrida 
attacked Foucault’s interpretation of Descartes, arguing that to read Descartes as contributing 
to a social structure of ‘reason and madness’ is to misunderstand Descartes’ essentially 
philosophical project. 7  
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‘Such an effort risks doing violence to this project in turn .... risks doing it violence in 
turn, and a violence of a totalitarian and historicist style which eludes meaning and the 
origin of meaning.’  ‘I am not saying that Foucault’s book is totalitarian ....’  Derrida 
goes on disingenuously,  ‘when I state that the [epigraph of the chapter on the great 
internment] becomes violence itself ....’. 8   
 But what precisely is the violence of which Derrida accuses Foucault?  How does it 
relate to the kinds of violence so often recounted in Foucault’s work at this time?  In effect, 
Foucault’s violence, according to Derrida, lies in his (Foucault’s) attempt to historicize the 
originary violence that gives the possibility of meaning but that cannot be recouped within 
meaning:  ‘the forced entry into the world of that which is not there and is supposed by the 
world’. 9  In contrast to Foucault’s treatment of violence as embodied practices, Derrida’s is 
focused on the relation of the philosopher to the conditions of possibility of meaning, a 
relation which can never be non-violent but which may be more or less violent. Historicism is 
violent and implicitly totalitarian (philosophically and politically) because it claims 
authoritative access to the meaning of meaning.10   Derrida's reading of the Cartesian cogito is 
therefore less violent than Foucault’s, because Derrida’s, unlike Foucault’s, does not reduce 
philosophy to history, or confuse specific historical phenomena with the conditions of 
historicity in general. 
… when I say that this reduction to intraworldliness is the origin and very meaning of 
what is called violence, making possible all straitjackets, I am not invoking an other 
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world, an alibi or an evasive transcendence. That would be yet another possibility of 
violence, a possibility that is, moreover, often the accomplice of the first one.’11   
 Foucault’s rejoinder to Derrida, published nearly ten years after Derrida’s critique, 
puts Derrida’s denial of ‘evasive transcendence’ into question.12   Most of Foucault’s response 
focuses on a close reading of Descartes’ text that aims to demonstrate the errors and 
weaknesses of Derrida’s equally close reading. The crux of Foucault’s critique of Derrida’s 
reading is that Derrida, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, precisely does not attend 
to Descartes' own words. He (Derrida) is able to make his argument only by sleight of hand 
tricks, such as assigning doubt as to the possibility of the philosopher’s madness to an other 
voice, and by ignoring or misconstruing the Latin text.13  On Foucault’s account, the 
Meditations are both the logical demonstration of a systematic set of philosophical 
propositions and an ascetic exercise ‘by which each reader must be affected, if he in turn 
wants to be the subject enunciating this truth on his own behalf’.14  In other words, the 
Meditations are as much about the production of a particular kind of subject as they are about 
the production of a particular meaning. Derrida’s reading, according to Foucault, ignores the 
ascetic, affective power of Descartes’ text entirely, reducing discursive practice to ‘textual 
traces’ and ‘marks for a reading’, and thereby confirming a disembodied authority in the 
reader (Derrida).  Foucault does not call Derrida’s reading 'violent'.  In this respect his 
language is notably more moderate than that of Derrida’s critique.  But he does conclude by 
identifying Derrida’s reading with the exercise of arbitrary sovereign power.15 
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 The cogito dispute speaks to fundamental differences between Foucauldian 
archaeology and genealogy and Derridean deconstruction. In relation to violence, it 
demonstrates the difference between Derrida’s philosophy, which continually invokes 
violence in the abstract context of the possibility of meaning, and which links the latter to 
potentially violent (totalitarian) political outcomes; and Foucault’s philosophy, which speaks 
little of meaning or of violence in the abstract, but ubiquitously of embodied discourses, 
practices and experiences of violence inherent in different relations of power. For Derrida it is 
originary violence, formally defined, that is the key focus of attention; for Foucault it is  the 
affective and productive dimension of different sorts of violent practice.  Although violence is 
inherent in discourse for Foucault, he does not treat it as inherent in meaning as such.  Hence, 
the relation between language and violence is for him contingent and historically shifting. 
There can be no ethical or political promise whatsoever in violence for Derrida.  But Foucault 
connects a particular kind of violence to the possibility of radical change. In the following 
sections we look more closely at how violence figures in the work of the two thinkers. 
 
3. Foucault 
 The significance of violence for politics for Foucault shifts with a chronological 
development from an early pervasive emphasis on the violence of order and power, and on 
transgression as the necessary political response, to a more complex set of accounts of the 
interaction of forms of violence with forms of state and social organisation.  Textually, we can 
locate these accounts in, first, the early publications Folie et deraison (1961), Naissance de la 
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clinique (1963), and Les Mots et les choses (1966); while the later view is worked out in the 
lectures that have recently been published as Society must be defended (1975-6), in La volonté de 
savoir (1976), and in the essay ‘Governmentality’ (1978).16   
 We begin with Foucault’s analysis of violence and confinement which culminates in 
‘Sadism’ as a cultural fact.  References to Sade are frequent in Foucault’s early books, in the 
context of his analysis of treatments of the human body, practices of confinement, and 
practices of exhibition.  As forms of visibility change  ‘what was invisible is now offered to 
gaze’.17   The hitherto unspoken and unconceptualised:- ‘emerges into the light of language – 
the same light that illuminates ... Sodom.18  The ‘world over which Sade extended his 
sovereignty’ is one in which madness has become a spectacle, and in which practices of 
confinement and restraint, using chains, ropes and cages, reach a level of violent intensity 
that makes clear that they are no longer inspired by any desire to punish nor duty to correct, 
but can only be understood as the expression of animality, or passion.19   Here Foucault’s 
analysis of power and violence focuses on discourses and disciplines.  Categories of normal 
and deviant, and classifications of forms of deviance, go hand in hand with forms of 
treatment and control.  For ‘the normal’ the categories and classifications enjoin modes of 
conduct, standards of action and behaviour, and supply a basis for judgement of acceptable 
and unacceptable.  For ‘the deviant’ the categories and classifications justify diverse forms of 
treatment by individuals in professional capacities, such as physician, and in political offices, 
such as gaoler or legislator.   
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 ‘Everything that morality, everything that a botched society, has stifled in man, revives 
in the castle of murders’.20  On one reading of Foucault, Sadeian violence realises, albeit in a 
distorted way, the violence of the new scientific world of classification, administration, 
manipulation and exploitation.  Or perhaps, we can say equally that modern social and state 
violence realises, albeit in a distorted way, the interpersonal bodily violence of the Sadeian 
‘castle of murders’.   The new sciences, and the concomitant bourgeois morality, attempt to 
repress and they oppress; they attempt to order and in so doing they do violence of a 
particular kind to human bodies and to social relationships.   Sade’s visions and 
representations of scenes of torture for pleasure, of subjugation in the cause of mastery,  stand 
as a kind of apotheosis of classical practices of representation, and hence as a reproach to 
modern science and art.  Further, though, the violence therein is not so much a reproach to 
modern violence, more a revelation of the violence that modernity disavows but cannot 
vanquish.  Modernity represents itself to itself as a pacific mode of ordering; but this alleged 
pacifism, or the superficial appearance of it, is possible only because of the violence of 
discipline, treatment, and classification and administration.    
 In The Order of Things Foucault observes that after Sade  
violence, life and death, desire and sexuality, will extend, below the level of 
representation, an immense expanse of shade which we are now attempting to recover, 
as far as we can, in our discourse, in our freedom, in our thought. 21    
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The thesis here is ambiguous.22  But whichever way it is interpreted, it articulates Foucault’s 
early fascination with the place of violence in social order and in resistance to it, in the pursuit 
of liberation.23  
 Three distinct theses about violence emerge out of Foucault’s early texts:   
 First, that Sadism and Sadeanism mirrors the violence of sovereignty, the violence of 
the state, and reveals, by reflection and refraction, the true nature of new forms of 
social control.   
 Second, the explicit avowal of this violence breaks through, transgressing the social 
order, and in this way reveals the disequilibrium in the superficially coherent surface 
of social and political life, but also puts that surface into a kind of social crisis.   
 Third, there is a celebration of, and pleasure in, this transgressive avowal. And 
following from this, there is a concomitant sense of loss as this explicit, articulated 
violence is lost in the modern world of disciplines and organised social institutions.24  
Foucault never lets go of this view that violence cannot be thought about without 
facing such experience of pleasure and loss.   
 In his later work these themes and theses recede.  The analysis of power moves from a 
focus on the physical treatment of individual bodies, first to disciplinary power, and then to a 
focus on populations.  In Society must be defended Foucault identifies a historical shift from 
interpersonal violence.  Classical theories of sovereignty, and discourses and practices of 
sovereignty, focussed on the sovereign’s power ‘of life and death’ – the power to put 
someone to death or to let them live.  But in the nineteenth century, with the new scientific 
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disciplines and associated practices of government, such traditional sovereign power is 
displaced by the power ‘to make live or let die’, as ‘the biological comes under state control’.25  
This power is non-disciplinary.  It is directed not to a man as a body, but to man at the level 
of species.26   
 In The History of Sexuality, an introduction (1978, originally La volonté de savoir, 1976) 
Foucault succinctly sets out his new model of biopower.  The new ‘biopolitics of population’27 
sees the ‘entry of phenomena peculiar to life of the species into the sphere of political 
techniques’.28  The medicalisation of bodies, statistical assessments of the entire social body, 
campaigns for the health of the race, bring discourses of ‘blood’ into relation with discourses 
of ‘sexuality’. Once again, de Sade enters the narrative  -   Sade speaks of sex without any 
norm or intrinsic rule; for him sexuality and passion are subject to the unrestricted law of a 
power which knows no other law but its own.29  But in later  discourses of sex, the 
preoccupation with blood continues in practices and regulation of marriage.30   
 Between the classical sovereignty of the power of death, and the modern governmental 
power of making life, comes the emergence in the early modern period of new discourses of 
war and politics premised on a race thinking that is antithetical to classical rationalism. In 
Society Must Be Defended, Foucault identifies the emergence of ‘us versus them’ discourses as a 
challenge to the traditional principle of sovereignty.  In contrast to the ‘violence and truth in 
the madman’s frenzy’ of his earlier analysis,  however, there is now no sense that this new 
challenge presents any alternative that is beyond sovereignty or beyond history. Instead 
Foucault traces how it brings new forms of power onto the scene which then intersect with 
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both sovereign and disciplinary power, ultimately amplifying rather than challenging the 
power and violence of the state.  We see a shift from group dynamics against sovereignty to 
group dynamics that become sovereignty's, and domination's, accomplice.  From the 
seventeenth century onwards, Foucault argues, enmity between different groups is expressed 
in terms of ‘races’: aristocratic bitterness against the crown and against the common people; 
puritan leveller struggles against foreign domination.31  During the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the discourse of race, rather than challenging sovereignty, becomes drawn into the 
confirmation of it. The biological continuum established by the new sciences is fissured by the 
discontinuity of ‘race’.  War is no longer the destruction of a political adversary, but of an 
enemy race.32  Nationalism and imperialism exemplify the interplay of sovereign and 
biopolitical power, culminating in the Stalinist and Nazi states.33  
'If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power, this is not because of a recent return 
of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated at the level of life, the species, 
the race, and the large scale phenomena of population.'34    
 From these considerations of violence and politics we can pull out two further theses, 
that emerge in Foucault’s later work, about violence.   They focus markedly less than the 
earlier ones on the emancipatory possibilities of transgressive violence as such, and more on 
the insistence that the link between violence and politics persists, whether the former begins 
in resistance or repression.   
 Fourth, therefore, the challenge to sovereignty is followed by resubjugation by 
discipline, and then by biopolitical techniques.  That is to say, forms of violence 
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combine with state and social governance in distinct and specific ways, but always are 
so combined, in ways that amplify rather than modify the state’s violent potential.   
 This leads to the fifth Foucaultian argument.  Contexts of power are very close to 
contexts of violence.  To be sure, there is a clear distinction between the exemplary and 
spectacular punishments described at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, and 
public health discourses and practices of hygiene and population fitness.  
Nevertheless, regimes of truth and discipline are bound up with the amplified violence 
of the modern, biolpolitical state; and effective oppositions to them are inevitably 
imbricated with violence.  
 
3. Derrida 
 For Derrida social, interpersonal violence is made possible by the more fundamental 
violence involved in the generation of meaning.  In his early work, as we have seen in his 
critique of Foucault’s treatment of the cogito, violence is discerned in conceptualisation and 
the drawing of grammatical and linguistic distinctions, in the formulation and promulgation, 
let alone enforcement, of rules including rules of language and of ethics.35  Violence, hence, is 
found to be central to philosophical projects and approaches including structuralism36, 
metaphysics or ontology37, as well as certain kinds of ethics38.   
 Derrida’s repeated search for culprits, the repeated identification of philosophers with 
unavowed violence, or with complicity in domination and worse, is strikingly like the 
persistent repudiation of monism and totalitarianism by other cold war philosophers like 
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Isaiah Berlin, Hannah Arendt and Karl Popper.39  There are of course marked differences.  
Berlin, Arendt and Popper focus on value, and on beliefs, while Derrida’s focus is on the 
process of making and establishing meaning.  For the first three, ‘monism’ invariably 
amounts to a philosophical, and hence political, reason for oppression, coercion, and in the 
extreme for imprisonment and annihilation.40  By contrast, Derrida sees the establishment and 
enforcement of meanings, categories, distinctions, themselves as acts of violence, not just 
pretexts for violence, although they can indeed be those as well.      
 In ‘Force and Signification’, the whole project of structuralism, consisting in the 
reduction of linguistic ‘sign’ to an underlying grammatical, psychological or social structure 
is characterised tout court as ‘a dream of violence’.41   Derrida’s criticism of structuralism 
relies on the paradox that structuralist analysis denies the ‘force’ element of meaning – that is, 
the intended and received significance of an utterance, which is distinct from the ‘meaning’.   
Structural analysis of language, and of social life, seeks to reveal the deep structure of 
meaning.  Derrida’s argument is that this is ‘possible only after a defeat of force’;42 ‘force is the 
other of language without which language would not be what it is’.43  In ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics’, Derrida argues that Levinas’ attempt to establish a non-violent ethics 
necessarily fails.44  
‘The very elocution of nonviolent metaphysics is its first disavowal ... every historical 
language carries within it an irreducible conceptual moment, and therefore a certain 
violence. ... If one does not uproot the silent origin from itself violently, if one decides 
not to speak, then the worst violence will silently cohabit the idea of peace.  ...  One 
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never escapes the economy of war ...  [T]o separate the original possibility of speech -  
as nonviolence and as gift - from the violence necessary in historical actuality, is to 
prop up thought by means of transhistoricity.’ 45 
Here we have a series of violences, in which the disavowal, repudiation or combat of one 
inevitably enacts another.  However, in this paper Derrida introduces, in addition to the ideas 
of first and subsequent violences, the evaluative idea of ‘worst’ and ‘least’.  There is no point 
asserting that speech is a nonviolent response to physical coercion  - because speech is 
conceptual, and hence is based on a violent assertion of a limit; further, speech breaks silence.  
There is no point asserting that ethical face to face encounter is nonviolent - because it is 
premissed on a proscription, ‘thou shalt not ...’.  However, the violence of speech, or ethical 
encounter, can well be better than ‘the worst’ violence.  The peace of silence, of saying 
nothing, can allow the worst violence to proceed. ‘The first violence is this dissimulation; but 
it is also the first defeat of nihilistic violence, and the first epiphany of being.’ 46 
 A similar scheme of first or originary and second, is set out in ‘The Violence of the 
Letter’ where a third violence is also introduced.   This chapter is a criticism of Levi-Strauss’s 
anthropology.  Derrida finds violence in Levi-Strauss’s ‘tone’: his account of a ‘writing lesson’ 
in a Nambikwara village (Brazil, in 1938) is recounted ‘in the tones of violence repressed or 
deferred, a violence sometimes veiled, but always oppressive and heavy’.47  More profoundly 
than a critical revelation of Levi-Strauss’s written rhetoric, however, Derrida is here 
concerned with the violence of language and writing.  Writing, and language, involve 
difference, classification, and the system of appellations’.48  Writing involves making a mark, 
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which is the sign for and stimulus for a sound; so neither mark nor vocalisation are pure.   
Analagously, societies are ‘capable of obliterating the proper’.49  That is to say, in any society 
individuals can be classified and grouped; they can have their individuality obliterated and 
overlain with some other order of ‘naming’.  Derrida here brings first or originary, and 
second or social and interpersonal, violence into clear and close relation with one another.  
The ‘originary violence of language which consists in inscribing difference’ ... severs ‘the 
proper from its property and its self-sameness’.50  The second, social violence ‘is no more 
simple than the use of proper names’.  Ruse, perfidy, oppression, evil, war, indiscretion, rape 
– all of these familiar and deplorable phenomena are connected with the originary violence 
which splits the self from itself, splits the thing from its identity, severs proper from property.   
 In Levi-Strauss’ anthropological narrative little girls in the village break a social rule by 
disclosing to him one another’s names, thereby mimicking, reenacting, and making plain the 
original violence of naming itself.  The anthropologist himself, of course, is to be held 
responsible for their ‘violence’; he is the violator.51   Derrida calls the first, originary violence, 
at this point, ‘arche violence’; while the second, social violence can also be referred to as ‘law’ 
(where ‘law’ signifies the rule that is trangressed).  And there is a third violence – that of the 
theoretical reflection and conceptualisation of the first and second, where, as he puts it, ‘the 
common concept of violence … should no doubt be situated’.52  The ‘third’ violence of 
reflection both reveals and relies on the first and second.   
 In these papers, then, Derrida offers two kinds of distinctions between violences.  First, 
schemes of ‘first, second, third’, or ‘originary and subsequent’.  These distinguish and relate 
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conditions of the possibility of meaning, with social relations, and with formulations like 
positive and moral law, rendering violence ubiquitous.  This provokes a Derridean leading 
question: ‘if it is true, as I in fact believe, that writing cannot be thought outside of the horizon 
of intersubjective violence, is there anything, even science, that radically escapes it?’53  The 
implications of Derrida’s account of violence are to some extent ameliorated by the second 
kind of distinction he draws: an evaluative distinction between better and worse, greater and 
lesser violence.  Derrida insists that ‘true violence’ is a breach of integrity.  It is from this 
understanding that naming itself, which splits self-identity, is a form of violence. So, too, are 
rape and lies.  So, too, is the presence of spectators in some social interaction.  But rough 
games, striking a comrade in the course of comradely interaction, are not truly violence 
because ‘no integrity has been breached’. 
 In his later work, Derrida’s concern with identifying the culprits who unwittingly 
unleash or support violence, recedes.  His focus, building on his analysis of the violence 
inherent in all meaning, turns rather to the insistence that any ostensibly ‘non-violent’ 
philosophy is a sham.  Second, it follows, we (all) must therefore take the measure of the 
violence that our philosophy, or our actions – endorsement or opposition – involve.  Third, 
we should engage and take responsibility for the lesser violence.  Derrida's later work 
focusses on paradoxes of violence, in ways that to some degree reiterate the form of his earlier 
criticism of Foucault, but which also, by way of the theme of responsibility, turns to a realist, 
but liberationist, political action. 54       
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 ‘The Force of Law’ begins with an extended consideration of the violence of being 
forced (or asked, or required) to speak in a language other than one’s own.  The distinction 
between ‘just force’ or ‘non-violent force’ and ‘violence that is always deemed unjust’ is 
problematised because, of course given what is true of language, it is not possible to ‘speak 
directly about justice ... without immediately betraying justice’.55  Here we have a reiteration 
of the form of his early criticism of Foucault.  Derrida goes on, partly through engagement 
with Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, to underline the philosophical and political relation 
between violence, law and justice.  In so doing he affirms his commitment to understanding 
violence as the violation of integrity, and his view that law requires such a violation. And so 
too does any concrete articulation of the aspiration to justice, since any such articulation 
necessarily does violence to integrity, reducing the unique and singular to other terms.  In 
this context, what becomes important is not the (necessarily doomed) quest for a non-violent 
politics but refusing to disavow one’s own violence and, more generally, not denying the risks 
of violence inherent in political action. 
 ‘The Politics of Friendship’ discloses ‘the silent unfolding of that strange violence that 
has forever insinuated itself into the origin of the most innocent expressions of friendship or 
justice’.56   Derrida’s considerations of hospitality and cosmopolitanism reveal similar 
difficulties: how can I be hospitable without property and a legal right to privacy and 
exclusion?57  The paradoxes, as it might be, of violence are, then, brought to prominence in 
these works.  And in this context of paradox, the theme of responsibility also becomes 
prominent.  To be sure, this is prefigured in Derrida’s demand that Levi-Strauss take 
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responsibility for the violence of his own observation of a society, of his manipulation of the 
society in order to discern its meaning, of his assumption that prior to his intervention with 
paper and pencils the Nambikwara lacked writing, despite the fact that they have language, 
and laws.58  The ‘strange violence that insinuates itself into the innocent experiences of 
friendship’ consists in our being caught in responsibility, having freedom imputed to us 
without being left free.59   
 At the end of ‘The Force of Law’ Derrida remarks that he is here unable to read the 
theme of responsibility in Walter Benjamin’s theory of ‘pure violence’.60  At the end of Politics 
of Friendship he returns to the Aristotelian ‘deliberate choice to live together’. 61  There is a ‘call 
to responsibility’ also in Spectres of Marx, where Marxism is found to be both necessary and 
structurally insufficient  as a response to the excesses of capitalism, to neo-liberal politics and 
economics, and as a response to the collapse of the soviet economies and states.62   ‘The ordeal 
of undecidability’ calls for decision, and promise – that is to say, responsibility.63  And 
responsibility, seemingly, involves a contingent support for the least worst, the lesser 
violence.64  
 How do Derrida’s evolving arguments about the significance of violence relate to 
Foucault’s views? As we saw above, for Foucault, the Nazi state represents ‘the paroxysmal 
point’ of an interplay between sovereign power and biopower that is ‘inscribed in the 
workings of all states’.65  And it testifies to the failure of what began as violence resistant to 
sovereignty to break through without reinstituting repressive violence. The message of Society 
Must Be Defended is grimly insistent on the inescapability of the violence inscribed in all states 
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and pessimistic about the possibility of any kind of ‘beyond’.  In ‘Force of Law’, Derrida’s 
final reflections on Benjamin also centre around the Nazi state and the final solution as the 
extreme case of the potential for violence inherent in all meaningful action and interaction.  
Derrida, however, is not interested in the specific combinations of regimes of truth and 
embodied practices that enabled Nazism as a historical phenomenon.  Rather, he is interested 
in the possibility of judgment.  He criticises Benjamin’s idea of ‘pure violence’ because of the 
ways in which it is open to interpretation as an endorsement of the justifiability of genocide.66  
As in his critique of Foucault in the cogito dispute, totalitarianism is located in the claim to 
authoritative ground.  Resistance to totalitarianism is not to be found by identifying practices 
that challenge totalitarian power, but through the constant affirmation of the groundlessness 
of one’s own claim to authority, and consequent diffidence about imposing one’s claims on 
others. 
 Let us return to Foucault’s five claims about violence elaborated in the previous 
section.  The differences with Derrida are particularly obvious in relation to the first four.   
 First, in contrast to Foucault’s starting point, Derrida begins not with the violence of 
the classical age, as mirrored in Sadism, but with the violence of language and 
philosophy. 67  Unlike on Foucault’s account, this is not a historically locatable 
violence, nor is it directly inscribed on bodies.  It is a violence that conditions thought 
but which is beyond thought. For Derrida the historically situated nature of Foucault’s 
analysis misses the essential point, which is that historical violences are always 
conditioned, and permitted, by a more fundamental violence.  
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 Second, whereas, at least in Foucault’s early work, violence breaks through, 
transgressing the social order, and putting the superficially coherent surface of social 
and political life into crisis, for Derrida such a breakthrough is impossible. There is no 
escape from the condition of arche-violence, the unavoidable violation of integrity 
underpinning the possibility of any kind of intersubjective relation. For Derrida, 
transgression is always recouped within the threefold structure of violence. The 
danger of ‘worst’ violence lies in the disavowal of this condition, a disavowal of which 
he accuses Foucault in the cogito dispute.  
 Third, therefore, Foucault’s celebration of transgressive violence in certain of his texts 
is anathema to Derrida, for whom violence is an inescapable, and always frightening, 
burden. Again, we see this in Derrida’s rejection of Foucault’s setting up of the 
‘madness’ of the past as a reproach to the modern disciplinary world in Madness and 
Civilization.   
 Fourth, for Foucault, emancipation from older forms of sovereignty is followed by 
resubjugation by new forms of discipline, and then by the technologies of biology and 
warfare that put whole populations into conflict with each other. For Derrida, the 
tertiary structure of violence enables different manifestations of empirical practices of 
violence in different historical and social contexts, but this does not mean that violence 
changes in any fundamental way. In contrast to Foucault’s emphasis on the specificity 
and historical contingency of violent practices, oppressive or resistant, Derrida’s 
emphasis is on the violence inherent in the condition of historicity as such. This means 
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that Foucault’s interest is in the effects and affects of violence, what it produces and 
how it is produced.  By contrast, Derrida’s interest is in the evaluation and limitation of 
a violence that is generic, formal and ineradicable in any world of meaning, from the 
Nambikwara’s to that of the Nazi state. 
 In spite of the strength of these differences, however, Derrida and Foucault also share 
ground, in two crucial respects, when it comes to relation between politics and violence.  
 For very different reasons both thinkers agree on Foucault’s fifth argument, which is 
that contexts of rule and government, and resistance to rule and government, in 
modern states, are always also contexts of violence.  
 And even as Foucault abandons the idea of violence enabling a radical breakthrough 
beyond specific modern forms of discipline and governmentality, and Derrida moves 
to think positively about what politics might be on the assumption of the ubiquity of 
violence, they converge on the normative significance of avowal for discrimination. 
From their earliest work, Foucault is concerned to debunk modernity’s, and Derrida is 
concerned to debunk philosophy’s,  disavowals of their own violence. The avowal of 
violence that has revolutionary possibilities in Foucault’s early work is still integral to 
the modest possibilities of resistant practice identified in his later work. Likewise, the 
negativity of Derrida’s avowal of violence in his early work remains integral to the 
idea of a responsible politics in his later work.    
 When we look at the trajectories of their respective work, there seems to be an inverse 
relation between Derrida and Foucault when it comes to their optimism or pessimism about 
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the implications of violence for politics. The earlier Foucault links violent transgression to 
liberation from power, while  the earlier Derrida offers little space for emancipation from the 
layers of violence that mark the relation between the possibility of meaning and the world of 
law, sociality and politics.  As Foucault develops his work into a focus on modern 
disciplinary and biopower, however, the idea of a violent breakthrough into another kind of 
social and political order disappears from view.  By contrast Derrida increasingly focuses on 
what it means to face up to political responsibility in the avowal of the ubiquity of violence, 
and argues for the possibility and the importance of distinguishing between greater and 
lesser violence.  
 
4. The Question of Judgement 
 There is, of course, much debate and dispute about the ‘political implications’ of 
deconstruction, and of Foucault’s structuralism and post-structuralism, in the sense of the 
question whether Foucault and Derrida were right wing or left wing.  Whose side they were 
on in the class wars as they were pursued in Europe in the 1960s, 70s and 80s?  Did Foucault’s 
commitments to violent action and transgression reveal him as participating in the kind of 
fascism with a small f that is common to left and right?68  Did Derrida’s emphasis on 
undecidability all along mask a commitment to decisionism?69  Theoretically, furthermore, 
there is a question whether their accounts of agency and circumstance afford an adequate 
theory of domination, submission, resistance and social change, and therefore whether their 
understandings of politics are really equal to the phenomena.  In addition, there is the 
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question of the lack of any explicitly meta-normative analysis, or any clear first order 
normative principle guiding the ‘shoulds’ and ‘should nots’ of politics, notwithstanding the 
explicitly prescriptive or evaluative aspects of their own texts. 70    
 The arguments of Derrida and Foucault, therefore, raise a series of questions. What 
follows from the two thinkers’ differently grounded claims as to the ubiquity and avowal of 
violence in politics? What resources do they give us for analytical or evaluative 
discriminations between different manifestations of violence in politics? And how do such 
arguments overlap with, or contest, other ways of conceptualising that relation?   We suggest 
that the arguments of the two thinkers can be located with reference to two distinct 
crossroads of western political thought, but in ways that push against the limitations of the 
perspectives with which they connect. In Foucault’s case, his views of politics and violence 
can be read as a crux between political realism and revolutionary radicalism. In Derrida’s 
case, the crux is instead between political realism and reformist liberalism. In both cases, 
however, the recognition and avowal of violence in politics goes much further than it does in 
the traditions with which their work interconnects. For both Foucault and Derrida, politics 
extends to all realms of discourse and practice, including their own.  For both of them, self-
consciousness about the political effects of their respective philosophical theories is crucial.   
Both of them resist the idea that there could be an a priori distinction between what is 
political and what is not. For this reason, neither thinker could endorse any ambition, such as 
Arendt’s, to keep violence apart from politics by definition.71  And both are open to drawing 
and re-drawing discriminations within and between the categories of politics and violence.    
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 For Foucault, processes, accretions, crystallisations constitute regimes of power, and 
also constitute contestations of regime.  The processes and accretions sometimes involve the 
violent oppression and injury of individuals; resistance to regimes involves organisation, the 
invocation of historically concrete relationships like rights, and forms of violence.72  Regimes 
include governments, systems of law, courts, institutions of punishment and control.  Their 
violence may be explicit, but in modernity is increasingly disavowed and understood in other 
terms.  For Derrida, philosophical and social practices of naming, promising (explicit, or as 
implicit as promising is in the deployment of a word or phrase), forms of violence such as the 
use of weapons and the enforcement of rules or prohibitions, the dilemmas of undecidability 
and decidability, are all clearly related on the one hand to the human capacity for language 
and on the other to the human capacity for state and social organisation and enforcement.  As 
a result, the power to govern and be governed, the deciding of laws and their application, the 
circumstance in which classes and groups are dominating or dominated - these are matters of 
politics, and to engage with them, intellectually or actively, is to engage in politics.    
 In a celebrated debate with Noam Chomsky in 1971 Foucault refused to follow any 
kind of pacific line.  Chomsky was looking from Foucault for a condemnation or repudiation 
of possible violence, which he refused.  
‘When the proletariat takes power, it may be quite possible that the proletariat will 
exert towards the classes over which it has triumphed a violent, dictatorial and even 
bloody power.  I can’t see what objection one might make to this.’73 
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In the same year, in a discussion with Pierre Victor and other Maoist activists in response to a 
project to set up a people’s court to judge the police, Foucault argued vigorously against any 
form of court, against procedures and protocols, which rather than being any form of popular 
justice are likely to be ‘its deformation’74.  Instead Foucault seems to approve the kinds of acts 
of popular justice that ‘flee from the court’ and that include spectacular bloody display, such 
as the parade of heads on stakes. 75 
 Foucault certainly does not, will not, explicitly address the question of transhistorical 
criteria for acceptability or non-acceptability of particular forms of violence.  For him, 
violence is part of the world and its life.  Life, for Foucault, the relationship of self to self and 
others in relation to power - to discipline, sovereign punishment and its threat, organised 
administration and technology - is historically variable, and the place of violence (meaning 
basically, swords and knives used on human bodies, blood and bruises, cuts and blows)  in 
this relationship similarly.  Neverthless, in spite of his resistance to drawing the line between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ violence, from his earliest work, Foucault's concern with violence is always 
to do with violence as a productive practice. Ultimately it is what violence does, not what it 
is, that is important.  What kind of relation to self and other does it produce, what kind of 
relations of power does it sustain or challenge?  This is always a contextual question.  
 Thus, whether and how particular forms of violence may be resistant to power will 
and must vary.  To be sure there is an obscenity in the scene of the hanging, drawing and 
quartering that he puts before us in the first pages of Discipline and Punish.  But the reader’s 
prurient engagement with, or horrified reaction to, that image is also a challenge to the selves 
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constructed through the disavowal of violence prefigured in the great internment. Foucault 
argues that there is something transgressive and hence progressive in de Sade’s reaction to 
confinement with his print scenes of torture for sexual gratification.  The feeling of pain as 
pleasure, a theme present throughout much of Foucault’s work, represents a possibility of 
resistance specifically within the context of disciplinary and bio-power. At the same time, 
however, as Foucault moves away from the notion of fundamental radical disruption of 
modern relations of power, he increasingly avows the dangers of his own discourse and the 
ultimate violence of legislating the meaning of resistance and alternatives in advance: 
the power that one man exerts over another is always perilous. I am not saying that power, by 
nature, is evil; I am saying that power, with its mechanisms, is infinite ... Against power one 
must always set inviolable laws and unrestricted rights.'.76 
 Through the course of Foucault’s work two different impulses seem to be at work 
when it comes to the relation between politics and violence. The radical resignation of his 
later work in many ways parallels the tradition of political realism associated with 
Clausewitz and Weber.77  Foucault’s considerations in Society Must be Defended start from a 
reversal of the Clausewitzian dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means.  
Foucault considers the implications of thinking of politics as the continuation of war.  The 
social and biopolitical implications of this are key preoccupations for him. Here, however, we 
are preoccupied with the pervasiveness of violence - the infliction of injury and pain on 
bodies by means of a variety of instruments and weapons - in Foucault’s, and in Clausewitz’s, 
work.  For Clausewitz, politics requires violence; and violence is an irreducible (primordial) 
 29
aspect of human conduct, which can, in the right conditions, be made politically serviceable.78   
Weber too takes it that ‘violent social action is obviously something absolutely primordial’79 
and for him violence is tied into the very concept of political association.80  Weber emphasises 
the collective and constructed nature of political violence in his own time.  His conception of 
discipline is clearly echoed in Foucault’s analyses of modern social relations: for Weber 
modern warfare is entirely a matter of instrumental rationality and requires instilled virtues 
of conscientiousness, courage and so on.81  We have seen that Foucault’s understanding of 
social relations is that violence will, often, be an aspect of them. It is magnified and refracted 
as it is suppressed and disciplined.  It is used against people by those who dominate, and 
against the dominators by those who are oppressed.  Insofar as there is any judgement to be 
made in this regard it is to do with whose side one is on, and with the effectiveness or 
otherwise of the means chosen, something of which there is no guarantee in advance.  
 Along with political realism, however, there is also a strand of Foucault’s thinking that 
links to the tradition of theorising revolutionary violence, not as a matter of means in relation 
to externally given ends, but as the expression of a constitutive relation to self radically 
distinct from the discursive constructions of the oppressor.  This is most evident in the 
‘violence and truth of the madman’s frenzy’, which gains its subversive power from the 
incapacity of the discourses of the classical age to capture it.  In the later work there is still an 
echo of Sorelian themes, in which the virtuous violence of the proletariat speaks to a different 
mode of self-making, beyond means-end thinking and capitalist relations of production and 
exchange.  To say that violence is both political and ubiquitous, as Foucault does, is not to say 
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that it is always the same or always carries the same value. But it is to deny both the existence 
of transhistorical standards against which politics and violence may be judged, and to deny 
the possibility of non-violent politics.   
 In contrast to Foucault, Derrida is always critical of violence. However, because he 
identifies the essence of violence with the violation of integrity that is the impossible ground 
of meaning as such, he, like Foucault, is unable to identify criteria for distinguishing ‘good’ 
from ‘bad’ political violence a priori.  Oppression, marginalisation, exploitation, 
disadvantage, injury are condemned, but the reasons for this are not quite clear.   Derrida’s 
own theory of violence, forcibly expressed throughout his work, is that the violence of 
ontology, or meaning, ‘permits’ the social violences of exploitation, terrorism etc.  This clearly 
raises the question of how Derrida can respond to the accusation that although his 
deconstructive method is designed to reveal the violence of the postulations, demarcations, 
conceptualisations, and metaphysics of other philosophers, he is unable himself to avoid 
exactly similar or analogous moves.82   Derrida concedes as much - conceding the violence of 
academic discussions in Limited Inc.83, conceding his own metaphysical complicity in the 
metaphysics he seeks to undo84.   It seems that Derrida obsessively seeks to unmask the 
violence in others’ work while all the time holding up his hands to the violence in his own. 
 In his explicit engagement with politics,  similarly to Foucault, there is a kind of 
political realism present in Derrida’s work.  Violence is socially and politically organised and 
perpetrated - by governments, by hostile groups and populations, by well meaning agencies 
who are trying to help, on individuals just because they are migrating, or are identified with a 
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particular ethnic or religious group, on the poor by way of deprivation and humiliation, 
because they are poor.  Always, however, these forms and occasions of violence are linked to 
‘the originary violence’ of naming, drawing distinctions in language.  They are linked in 
particular to the postulation of, and insertion into the world,  of that which is not there - that 
is to say, in metaphysical postulations of ‘things’ that are outside our world of language, text 
and interaction.     
 In The Politics of Friendship, Of Hospitality, and Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness the 
themes of impossibility and undecidability are present: the duty of hospitality must be 
premissed on the right of property and hence to exclude and withhold hospitality;85 the 
contexts of friendship must always be close to those of enmity.86  When we take these 
impossibilities together with Derrida’s scheme of ‘worst’ and the ‘lesser’ violence, clearly we 
are given the justification for choosing, weighing up, forms of violence against each other, 
and making political and ethical judgements.  In his later work this distinction between the 
worse and lesser violence is joined by a commitment to the historical construction of human 
rights87, and to the principle that ‘justice does not end with law’.88  Whilst always holding 
back from any straightforward transcendentalism, the ‘quasi transcendentalism’ 
acknowledged in Derrida’s later work links his position to liberal traditions of ethical 
discrimination between good and bad violence.  The echo of the sovereign gesture that 
Foucault discerned in Derrida’s reading of Descartes can be traced in Derrida’s commitment 
to an unknowable justice, and the capacity it offers to discriminate between greater and lesser 
violence. On this basis he is able to identify (as lesser violence) with the impossible ideal of 
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Europe, against the violence of Al Quaeda.89   He does so, however, always without certainty 
of the grounds and effects of his own discrimination, and as with Foucault, with the certainty 
that there can be no politics without violence.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 There are important shifts over time in the focus and emphases of Foucault and 
Derrida in their implied theories of politics and violence.  Their opposition in the dispute over 
the cogito prefigures these differences, and also prefigures certain commonalities.   It seems 
plausible that had he lived Foucault would have seen in Derrida’s cautious alignment with 
‘Europe’, just another exercise of sovereign power perpetuating the violent exclusion of a 
radical ‘other’. Foucault consistently remained sceptical of the pacific claims of modern liberal 
orders.  For him Derrida’s argument would be understood as violently disingenuous - yet 
another disavowal by Europe of Europe’s violence.  There are clear  parallels between the ways 
Foucault and Derrida sensitise us to the political significance of the avowal and disavowal of 
violence in politics.  But their own readings of this significance remain different.  
 Both extend the insights inherent in political realism to a broader discursive realm, 
which does not respect fixed distinctions between state and civil society, for instance, or 
politics and society.  Both also hold on to an ambition to discriminate between different kinds 
of violence. With Foucault, however, the grounds of this discrimination are built into an 
oppositional understanding of modern power.  The violence that critics, oppositional 
thinkers, and resisters must value enacts a challenge to the disavowed violence of modern 
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states.  These both depend on and deny the violence of their regimes of juridical, disciplinary 
and biopolitical power. For Derrida, by contrast, violence is never positively valued.  At most, 
it might be more or less in keeping with an aspiration towards justice.  This aspiration must 
be  as transhistorical as is the impossibility of justice in any meaningful intersubjective 
relation.  
 For Foucault violence and politics can only be understood in the context of embodied 
experience and practice, in the worlds of historical subjectivities.  For Derrida, his interest in 
the theme of violence is  part of his enquiry into the very conditions of historicity, rather than 
forming any kind of interest in the history of violence.  That both of them, lately, endorse 
trans-state institutions and practices of human rights and laws is a notable convergence, 
perhaps best understood as a sign of their respective versions of political realism.  But the 
convergence is from the contrasting starting points of embodied historicity, and ahistorical 
possibility, respectively.   
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